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1
 
Executive Summary 
 
In 1997 the government of Mexico implemented 
PROGRESA (Programa de Educaciόn, Salud, y 
Alimenaciόn), an integrated approach to poverty 
alleviation through the development of human capi-
tal. PROGRESA was one part of a larger poverty 
alleviation strategy, and its role was to lay the 
groundwork for a healthy, well-educated population 
who could successfully contribute to Mexico’s eco-
nomic development and break the intergenerational 
cycle of poverty. The program offered conditional 
cash transfers to the rural poor in exchange for 
sending their children to school and for regular 
attendance at health clinics and pláticas (small 
group sessions focusing on health and nutrition 
education). The conditional cash transfers replaced 
many earlier programs focused on poverty allevia-
tion through the delivery of food subsidies and 
other in-kind transfers, which for political and 
logistical reasons often did not reach the rural 
poor in great numbers and were largely regarded as 
inefficient. The conditional cash transfers were 
demand-driven interventions that sought to remove 
many of the practical barriers and opportunity 
costs rural families faced in attending health clinics 
and sending their children to school (for example, 
children were often taken out of school to earn 
income for the family). The program sought to 
work with program beneficiaries and enable them 
to take responsibility for their own family’s welfare.  
 
Overall, the program was found to be quite suc-
cessful in improving conditions of the poor. Owing 
to an emphasis on evaluation from the program’s 
inception, the program design and data collection 
strategies have allowed for extensive documentation 
of these successes. For instance, attendance in sec-
ondary school has increased by more than 20 
percent for girls and 10 percent for boys in benefi-
ciary households. PROGRESA children had a 12 
percent lower incidence of illness than non-
PROGRESA children. PROGRESA increased the 
number of prenatal visits in the first trimester of 
pregnancy by 8 percent. Food expenditures in 
PROGRESA households were 13 percent higher 
than in non-PROGRESA households, with 
PROGRESA households consuming higher-quality 
foods and more calories. PROGRESA children aged 
12–36 months were on average one centimeter 
longer than non-PROGRESA children of similar 
ages.  
 
PROGRESA was not, however, without its chal-
lenges and disappointments. Although school 
attendance improved, school performance lagged 
behind. Concerns were raised about the increased 
workloads of teachers and health professionals, as 
well as rural women, who bore many new responsi-
bilities in the program. The new organization of 
PROGRESA (requiring the collaboration of several 
agencies) also raised new political and organizational 
challenges at the national and state level, and 
PROGRESA (now called Oportunidades) faces the 
ongoing challenge of maintaining program consist-
ency and sustainability until all program objectives 
are met during continually changing political times. 
 
The government of a developing country would 
like to initiate a poverty alleviation program similar 
to PROGRESA. What suggestions to improve the 
program would you make? 
 
Background 
 
In 1997 the government of Mexico implemented 
PROGRESA (Programa de Educaciόn, Salud, y 
Alimenaciόn), an integrated approach to poverty 
alleviation through the development of human capi-
tal. PROGRESA was demonstrated to be a success-
ful human development program and has con-
sequently become a template for other poverty 
alleviation strategies in Central and South American 
countries. PROGRESA adopted an unusual 
approach that may have been key to its success. It 
integrated three essential components of human 
development—education, health, and nutrition—
while enabling Mexico’s poorest citizens to take 
responsibility for their own health and education 
decisions. PROGRESA was also notable for the 
attention it paid to evaluation, without which the 
successes of the program would clearly have been 
much more difficult to show, particularly in 
changing political times. In 2000, as the political 
administration in Mexico changed, PROGRESA 
transitioned into the Oportunidades Program, 
which continued many of the successful elements 
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of PROGRESA while integrating some suggested 
improvements.  
 
PROGRESA began under the administration of 
President Ernesto Zedillo in 1997, partly in response 
to the significant economic downturn in late 1994 
that threatened Mexico’s poorest citizens most 
acutely. The administration and key poverty experts 
recognized the need to rethink and reorganize 
earlier poverty alleviation programs—most notably 
food subsidy programs, which largely served as 
income transfer programs—to protect Mexican 
citizens from future shocks and propel the poorest 
citizens into more secure economic circumstances 
(Levy 2006). Designed to replace many earlier sub-
sidy and poverty programs, PROGRESA encour-
aged several ministries within the Mexican govern-
ment to work together (that is, to work horizon-
tally) to implement this complex and integrated 
program. At its launch, the program served 
300,000 families in 6,344 localities in 12 states 
with a budget of US$5.8 million (Levy 2006). The 
program was gradually phased in over several years, 
targeting the poorest people in marginalized areas 
first (a population with historically low service 
access). About half of the initially targeted localities 
received the program the first year, with similarly 
poor localities receiving the program in the 
following years. This staged implementation 
occurred for practical logistical reasons, but also 
allowed researchers to evaluate the program’s 
impact by comparing program and nonprogram 
areas. Today the Oportunidades Program serves 
both the rural and urban poor—nearly 25 percent 
of the Mexican population—and is the largest 
poverty alleviation program in Mexico (Levy 2006).  
 
Why PROGRESA? 
PROGRESA was originally conceived to correct 
some of the problems seen in other Mexican 
poverty and food insecurity alleviation programs, 
while taking a more comprehensive approach to 
human capital development. The following points 
outline what made PROGRESA different from 
some earlier Mexican social programs, and most 
important, how these design features contributed 
to some of its successes and challenges.  
 
First, PROGRESA made considerable effort to 
target the poorest households within impoverished 
communities. Poor communities were identified 
using a marginality index derived from census data; 
then community-wide surveys were conducted 
within these communities to identify the poorest 
households to be targeted by the program. These 
families were those most likely to benefit from 
services. In contrast, other social programs, like 
subsidies for tortillas, experienced considerable 
leakage to nonpoor households. This leakage 
undermined the success of other programs by 
thinly spreading benefits among disadvantaged 
households while greatly raising government costs 
(Skoufias 2005). The process used to identify poor 
households in PROGRESA also made the program 
less susceptible to political influence and abuse, 
which in the past had undermined poverty allevia-
tion programs by directing benefits to favored 
political zones or households and not necessarily to 
where they were most needed (Skoufias 2005). 
   
Second, PROGRESA minimized many of the market 
distortion effects of earlier subsidy programs. Food 
subsidy programs in the past functioned largely as 
income transfer programs, with beneficiaries 
receiving either free or reduced-price food. In the 
years since those subsidy programs were initiated, 
food subsidies were shown to be an inefficient 
mechanism for transferring income. Poor families 
can only consume so much food, and so the impact 
of the program is automatically limited. Many food 
subsidies reached wealthier families, whereas many 
poor rural families were unable to benefit from the 
programs because of the logistical difficulty of 
transporting and storing food over long distances 
to isolated locations. Food subsidies also distort the 
market prices of food, creating inefficiencies in 
food production and consumption.  
 
Third, PROGRESA had lower national administra-
tive costs than many other social programs. Evalua-
tions by IFPRI showed that for every 100 pesos 
spent on PROGRESA, 8.2 pesos were spent on 
program and administration costs. In contrast, food 
subsidy programs in place before PROGRESA, like 
LINCOSA (milk subsidy) and TORTIBONO 
(tortilla subsidy), had program costs of 40 and 14 
pesos respectively (Skoufias 2005). One reason 
PROGRESA was able to achieve this efficiency was 
its large scale: it was able to spread fixed overhead 
costs among many beneficiaries. PROGRESA also 
made use of cash transfers (instead of food dona-
tions or subsidies), which helped keep transporta-
tion and storage costs low. The integration of 
PROGRESA into existing educational and health 
care systems also kept costs low. PROGRESA 
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provided few supply-side enhancements to these 
systems, instead focusing its resources on transfer 
incentives to program beneficiaries (Levy 2006). 
Consequently, it could be argued that PROGRESA 
created some new costs within the integrated health 
care and educational systems, as well as at the 
household level, that are not fully accounted for in 
cost analyses. These topics will be discussed further 
in the section “Policy Issues.” 
 
Fourth, the multisectoral focus of PROGRESA 
recognized the integrated nature of education, 
health, and nutrition. Improving people’s educa-
tional achievement is essential to improving the 
economic potential of households and of the coun-
try as a whole. Yet improving access to education is 
not sufficient to achieve improved educational 
status among children and young adults. Children 
who are sick, hungry, or malnourished face consid-
erable barriers to learning, some of which are easily 
reversible with appropriate access to health care 
and adequate food. Indeed, poor health care and 
inadequate access to nutritious food also prevents 
adults from achieving their full economic potential 
(for example, anemia has been shown to decrease 
the work potential of women in Mexico; Haas and 
Brownlie 2001), with rippling consequences for the 
household and economic development. 
 
Treating health care and food access issues inde-
pendently misses the crucial interdependence of 
these factors for human development. Research has 
clearly demonstrated that being malnourished 
greatly increases an individual’s susceptibility to 
sickness, can exacerbate the effects of that sickness, 
and can increase the risk of long-term morbidity 
and mortality (Pelletier and Frongillo 2003). Like-
wise, sickness can create malnutrition by reducing 
an individual’s ability to work or to grow or buy 
food. The relationship of sickness and malnutrition 
is a downward spiral of suffering, hunger, and 
poverty that can have intergenerational effects 
when adults become too sick to work and children 
grow up without adequate access to food, educa-
tion, and health care. 
 
Fifth, PROGRESA worked to negate the oppor-
tunity cost many poor families faced in choosing to 
send their children to school rather than into the 
workforce. Poor families often rely on the wage 
labor of their children, even if they recognize the 
importance of education and wish to send their 
children to school.  PROGRESA provides educa-
tional transfers to households whose child achieves 
at least an 85 percent attendance rate at school, 
with even higher transfers for older children (of 
secondary-school age) who are more likely to drop 
out to join the workforce (Skoufias 2005).   
 
Sixth, PROGRESA worked to address several issues 
of inequality that hindered human development in 
the past. Cultural biases against girls’ attending sec-
ondary school and the financial benefits families 
accrue from the marriage of their young teenage 
daughters have hindered girls’ educational achieve-
ments. To encourage families to send girls to 
school, PROGRESA provided girls with a higher 
transfer for attending secondary school than 
similarly aged boys. Also, by design, food and edu-
cational transfers were given to women heads-of-
households with the reasonable belief that women 
were more likely to spend the transfers on 
improvements for their family. Program designers 
also believed this arrangement would empower 
women with more control in overall household 
decisions (Skoufias 2005). Although this does seem 
to have been the case, PROGRESA also created 
new duties and time-consuming tasks for women, 
which will be addressed further in “Policy Issues.”   
 
Components of the Program 
PROGRESA had two major components: (1) educa-
tion promotion and (2) health and nutrition 
improvements.  
 
The objectives of the educational component were 
to improve the school enrollment, attendance, and 
educational performance of children in targeted 
households. To achieve these objectives, 
PROGRESA applied four mechanisms: 
 
1. a system of educational grants; 
2. monetary support for acquisition of 
school materials; 
3. strengthening of the supply and quality of 
educational services; and 
4. cultivation of parental responsibility for 
and appreciation of the advantages stem-
ming from their children’s education 
(Skoufias 2005). 
 
The educational grants were used to encourage 
parents to send their children to school, with 
higher transfers for secondary-school students and 
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for girls. These cash transfers were given to 
mothers every two months provided their child 
had achieved an 85 percent attendance rate. Fre-
quent failure to meet the attendance requirement 
caused a permanent loss of benefits. Schools kept 
records of attendance and sent them to the central 
PROGRESA office, which awarded the benefits. 
Mothers were required to go to designated loca-
tions within their community to receive the educa-
tional transfer, possibly incurring significant time 
and transportation costs. To prevent any fertility 
consequences of the program, educational transfers 
were only provided to children over seven years of 
age. Additionally, to prevent dependence on the 
program by participating families, the total monthly 
transfer (including educational grants and food 
transfers for health care visits) was capped. The 
amount of the educational transfer was adjusted 
every six months to maintain the real cash value of 
the benefit. 
 
Households also received an allowance for school 
supplies. If the child attended one of the many 
public schools, these supplies were provided 
directly to the school. In other cases the families 
received an allowance directly. 
 
PROGRESA provided fewer resources for strength-
ening the quality and supply of educational services 
than it did educational grants. Overall, PROGRESA 
was designed to be a demand-side intervention that 
reduced barriers to receiving an education among 
poor families rather than a supply-side intervention 
that would increase the availability of educational 
resources. 
 
The second component of PROGRESA sought to 
improve the health and nutritional status of all 
household members, with special emphasis on 
maternal and child health. The primary approach 
was preventive health care to enable households to 
recognize and ward off common causes of illness 
and thus decrease their incidence. To achieve this 
end, PROGRESA provided the following services 
and supplies: 
 
1. a basic package of primary health care 
services; 
2. nutrition and health education; 
3. improved supply of health services, includ-
ing continuing education for doctors and 
nurses; 
4. nutrition supplements for pregnant and 
lactating women and young children; and 
5. cash transfers for the purchase of food 
(Skoufias 2005). 
 
All household members were expected to attend a 
regular schedule of health clinic appointments, 
focused on primary care. In exchange for main-
taining this schedule of visits, families received a 
grant for the purchase of food once every two 
months. Pregnant and lactating women and their 
young children up to the age of two years were 
seen most regularly—every one to three months, 
depending on the stage of gestation or the age of 
the child. Other adults and non-childbearing 
women were scheduled to be seen once a year. 
Although technically the failure of even one family 
member to attend one of these visits jeopardized 
the household’s opportunity to receive the food 
grant, some liberty to reschedule less critical 
appointments was allowed (Skoufias 2005). 
 
In addition to complying with required primary 
health care visits, members of beneficiary house-
holds were also expected to attend regular nutri-
tion and health care classes called pláticas. Because 
mothers were the primary caretakers, these classes 
were directed toward them, but all community 
members were invited to attend. The goal was to 
create a community atmosphere of preventive care 
that reinforced household and clinical efforts. 
Classes covered 25 different topics ranging from 
nutrition and family planning to immunization and 
hygiene. Participants were taught, for example, how 
to recognize the signs of illness, how to reduce 
health risks, and how to follow procedures given 
during their primary care visits (Skoufias 2005). 
The clinic maintained attendance records at health 
clinic visits and pláticas to qualify households for 
the food grant. 
 
Another major part of the health and nutrition 
component of PROGRESA was nutritional moni-
toring. Pregnant and lactating women, infants, and 
children up the age of five years were closely moni-
tored for signs of malnutrition. When identified, 
these individuals were given nutritional supple-
ments. Limited resources were also available to 
improve the quality of care in health clinics, but as 
with education, PROGRESA directed more 
resources to reducing barriers to receiving good 
health than to increasing the supply of that care 
(Skoufias 2005). 
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Evaluation 
From the beginning PROGRESA was designed for 
rigorous evaluation. The logistical challenges of 
rolling out a large program like PROGRESA 
required that the program be implemented in 
stages, with certain regions receiving the program 
initially and other regions following suit in a couple 
of years. This approach created a natural oppor-
tunity for an experimental design: regions receiving 
the program could be compared with similar 
regions (in terms of socioeconomic indicators, 
population demographics, and other factors) as yet 
without the program. In addition, data were col-
lected on households before and after they 
enrolled in the program. Overall, data were col-
lected from a variety of sources, including exten-
sive in-house interviews with program beneficiaries, 
interviews with teachers and health professionals, 
observation of program components in action, and 
focus groups with beneficiaries.  
    
After two years of program implementation, the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
evaluated the program and found that overall 
PROGRESA had made progress in achieving its 
goals. Specifically, PROGRESA increased enrollment 
in secondary schools, with the biggest impact 
among girls (enrollment increased 10 percent for 
boys and more than 20 percent for girls) (Skoufias 
2005). Although enrollment in Mexico is typically 
high in primary school, it declines sharply after the 
sixth grade. Consequently, increased enrollment in 
secondary school was estimated to increase the 
average school attainment by 0.42 to 0.90 years 
for boys and 0.73 years of school for girls 
(Behrman et al. 2004). The program also increased 
clinic visits and improved some measures of nutri-
tional status among infants and children. Women’s 
visits to health clinics during their first trimester 
increased by 8 percent, and this increase was 
demonstrated to improve the health of infants and 
pregnant women. Young children (ages 12–36 
months) in PROGRESA were on average one 
centimeter longer than young children in non-
PROGRESA localities. Young children (ages one to 
five years) in PROGRESA were also 12 percent less 
likely to get sick. Some of these improvements 
could have been due to improved nutritional intake 
in PROGRESA households. Median food expendi-
tures were 13 percent higher in PROGRESA house-
holds (including higher intakes of fruits, vegetables, 
meats, and other animal foods), and median caloric 
intake increased by 10.6 percent, with PROGRESA 
households reporting that they were eating better. 
Overall, these improvements were expected to 
significantly increase the overall productivity of 
young children when they reached adulthood. 
Adults participating in PROGRESA also reported 
improvements in ability to work and fewer days of 
sickness (Skoufias 2005).  
  
The evaluation of the first few years of PROGRESA 
also revealed several areas in need of improvement, 
some of which were addressed later in 
Oportunidades. For instance, although PROGRESA 
improved school enrollment, it had less impact on 
school performance and regular school attendance. 
Oportunidades attempted to address this aspect of 
the program through measures like linking the suc-
cessful completion of a grade with bonuses. 
PROGRESA was also shown to have a much 
greater impact on secondary school enrollment 
than primary school enrollment (which was already 
quite high), so Oportunidades shifted resources 
from encouraging primary school attendance to 
promoting secondary school attendance and even-
tually provided resources to encourage high school 
attendance (Levy 2006).   
 
Policy Issues 
 
Ensuring Receipt of Benefits by Targeted 
Population 
While the idea of targeting poverty alleviation 
programs to those who could most benefit was not 
new, the success of PROGRESA in generally 
reaching the designated population set the program 
apart from most other poverty alleviation programs 
in Mexico at that time. Poverty alleviation pro-
grams in the past failed to reach many rural local-
ities, where the majority of the poor lived, for 
logistical and political reasons. For instance, food 
subsidy programs required adequate rural infra-
structure to store and transport food over long 
distances, resources often lacking in remote loca-
tions where many poor households lived. Conse-
quently, many programs disproportionately bene-
fited easy-to-reach urban dwellers, who made up a 
smaller percentage of the poor (Levy 2006). The 
poor in rural areas were also less likely to organize, 
owing to their isolation and dispersion, making 
them less politically potent. 
 
Because PROGRESA offered cash transfers (with 
the exception of nutritional supplements for 
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women and young children), the program required 
fewer physical and administrative resources to dis-
tribute benefits, making it more adaptable to the 
rural landscape. But most important, from the 
program’s inception PROGRESA administrators 
effectively positioned the program to make it less 
susceptible to political influence and manipulation, 
forces that in the past had steered benefits from 
other programs to urban and less-poor popula-
tions. Although a full accounting of the steps taken 
are beyond the scope of this case (see Levy 2006 
for more information), a few points in this regard 
should be discussed. First, in developing 
PROGRESA, Mexico relied heavily on expertise 
from researchers and other professionals in 
poverty alleviation and human development, help-
ing to decouple program design from more vested 
political interests to some extent. For instance, 
many food subsidy programs had been criticized 
for doing more to aid well-off agricultural pro-
ducers (who used the program as a profitable 
marketing strategy) than to improve the well-being 
of poor beneficiaries.  
 
Second, PROGRESA adopted transparency and 
accountability in all program activities. Thus, all 
program activities, including program targeting and 
enrollment, were open to viewing and scrutiny. 
Outside institutions took advantage of the availa-
bility of these data to evaluate program effective-
ness and fairness. The appearance of a “clean” pro-
gram helped convince Congress and dueling politi-
cal parties that PROGRESA was not unfairly bene-
fiting one party over another, and thus most politi-
cians could support PROGRESA without incurring 
political risk. 
 
Third, the centralized nature of the program 
created fewer intercessors between the national 
government and program beneficiaries—benefits 
proceeded from the central ministry to program 
beneficiaries passing through only a few administra-
tive hands. In the past, less centralized programs 
were more susceptible to political manipulation and 
corruption as program benefits were used to 
further local political ends (Levy 2006). 
 
Setting the Right Conditions 
PROGRESA was designed to encourage behaviors 
deemed appropriate and instrumental for human 
capital development in Mexico, by conditioning 
cash transfers on compliance with school 
attendance and health clinic visit requirements. For 
conditioning to work, however, program adminis-
trators must ensure that programs are structured 
to encourage the intended behavior change while 
minimizing unintended, and potentially damaging, 
behaviors. Achieving successful conditioning 
requires detailed information about the culture and 
dynamics of the population to be targeted. For 
instance, PROGRESA conditioned cash transfers on 
school attendance but not school performance. 
Consequently, evaluations revealed that some 
students were showing up to school but not suc-
ceeding academically, ultimately minimizing the 
program’s effectiveness.  
 
Program administrators must also be sure they are 
offering incentives at the right level. For instance, if 
households are not offered a high enough cash 
incentive to take their children out of the work-
force and send them to school, conditioning cash 
transfers on school attendance is likely to fail. On 
the other hand, too high a cash transfer for school 
attendance may discourage adult household mem-
bers from working, create dependency, or have 
inadvertent effects on fertility. Thus, maximum 
monthly household cash transfers (including the 
cash transfer for school attendance, school sup-
plies, and health clinic attendance) were capped at a 
level judged to prevent these unintended effects. 
 
Cash Transfers, In‐Kind Transfers, or Food 
Subsidies?  
PROGRESA departed from many other poverty 
and hunger alleviation programs at the time by 
offering beneficiaries cash instead of food or food 
subsidies. Food from subsidy and transfer pro-
grams can be consumed directly by beneficiaries or 
sold in the open market, but this food is generally 
regarded as a poor mode of hunger and poverty 
reduction for reasons already discussed. Cash trans-
fers, on the other hand, increase the amount of 
money in the hands of community members and 
stimulate demand for food (and possibly other 
needed goods), with positive multiplier effects for 
rural economies. Cash transfers also have, however, 
potential drawbacks. If the supply of food in local 
rural economies is inelastic, increased demand could 
cause food prices to rise, negating any benefit of 
increased household income. Evaluations of 
PROGRESA, however, showed that this inflationary 
effect on food prices did not occur (Hoddinott et 
al. 2000). Additionally, concerns were raised that 
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“free money” would be squandered on “men’s 
vices” like alcohol and cigarettes. Overall, however, 
evaluations showed that on average 72 percent of 
the transfer was spent on food, with the rest of the 
cash going to other needed household items like 
clothing or home improvements (Hoddinott et al. 
2000).    
 
Additional Indirect Program Costs 
Other indirect program costs include the cost to 
medical clinics and schools to serve increased num-
bers of program beneficiaries, many of whom may 
require more than the average amount of resources 
owing to their ill health and lack of earlier educa-
tion. This increased demand could affect service 
quality or lead to service rationing. Staff members 
also incur a time cost, which was not reimbursed, 
when keeping track of program attendance. 
Program beneficiaries, particularly women, incur 
costs from their participation in the program. 
Getting to cash transfer distribution points and 
health clinics costs beneficiaries time and money. 
Some women face increased work at home because 
their children are at school and not performing 
household chores. Some concerns have also been 
raised about whether transferring cash benefits to 
women in exchange for their “being better 
mothers” reinforces normative gender roles 
(Luccisano 2006). What effect does this have on 
family dynamics? And should mothers be the only 
household members burdened with these additional 
responsibilities? 
 
Inter‐Ministry Collaboration and Conflict 
The implementation of PROGRESA relied heavily 
on existing educational and medical resources. 
Generally, the ability of these resources to grow 
arose from the political pressure placed on the 
appropriate national ministries to shift their 
resources and attention to PROGRESA. Coordina-
tion and cooperation among these ministries and 
agencies was not, and is still not, without its com-
plications and conflicts. The Mexican government 
continues to struggle with designing the appro-
priate incentives and structure to encourage 
greater horizontal linkages among agencies (Levy 
2006).  
   
An additional source of conflict among govern-
ment agencies arose from PROGRESA’s funding 
mandate, which stated that PROGRESA was to 
replace many of the old poverty alleviation pro-
grams, while continuing social welfare programs 
were to shift many of their resources to promote 
PROGRESA’s objectives. Not surprisingly, bureau-
crats working for other social welfare programs 
wanted to protect and expand their agencies’ 
programs and resources. Politicians looking to 
garner public notice also had incentives to add new 
social welfare programs to PROGRESA or to 
siphon resources to entirely new initiatives. These 
new programs could draw resources away from 
PROGRESA, jeopardizing its ability to meet 
medium- and long-term objectives (Levy 2006). 
 
To Evaluate or Not to Evaluate? 
As already stated, evaluation played a critical role in 
PROGRESA’s development and continuation 
through changing political times. From the begin-
ning, PROGRESA made evaluation a major compo-
nent of the program design and roll-out and dedi-
cated the needed resources. Although evaluation 
costs money, a well-planned and ongoing program 
evaluation can discover problems in program 
implementation, adjust program design to better 
meet program objectives, and in the case of suc-
cessful programs, ensure funders that programs are 
worth continuing. 
 
Stakeholders 
 
Poor Rural Families 
Poor rural families are the primary beneficiaries of 
PROGRESA and as such have the most to gain 
from the program. Nonetheless, as discussed, the 
program imposes costs on beneficiaries. Women in 
particular incur significant time and transportation 
costs to meet the conditions of the program. Yet 
evaluations of beneficiary perceptions of the pro-
gram generally have shown positive feelings toward 
the program (Levy 2006). Evaluations of 
PROGRESA clearly show that poor rural children 
are benefiting from the programs, specifically in 
terms of school attendance, growth, and receipt of 
timely health care. 
 
Urban Families 
Urban families, regardless of their income, were 
not beneficiaries of PROGRESA, although the later 
Oportunidades program does include poor urban 
families. Poor urban families have traditionally been 
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the beneficiaries of most other Mexican poverty 
alleviation programs for political and logistical 
reasons. Was it fair to target the PROGRESA 
program to the rural and not to the urban poor? 
 
Teachers and Administrators in Rural 
Schools 
Teachers and administrators working at schools in 
targeted areas reported increased attendance, likely 
increasing their workload without concomitant 
increases in resources. Some students attending 
school for the first time were cognitively behind 
their peers, requiring additional time and attention 
from their teachers and thereby reducing the 
already limited amount of time teachers can spend 
with students (Behrman et al. 2000; Escobar and 
González de la Rocha 2000). Teachers and adminis-
trators were also charged with keeping track of 
school attendance, a task that was reportedly not 
always carried out accurately or completely 
(Luccisano 2006). 
 
Health Care Professionals in Rural Clinics 
Like teachers, health care professionals could have 
experienced increased caseloads as a result of 
PROGRESA and faced increased time costs asso-
ciated with keeping track of program participation, 
including participation in pláticas.  Improving the 
quality of health care supplied by these providers 
continues to be a goal of Mexican poverty allevia-
tion programs. 
 
Staff and Advocates of Other Poverty 
Alleviation Programs 
PROGRESA was designed from the outset to 
replace many earlier poverty alleviation programs. 
As discussed, this design caused some tension 
among existing agencies, which were now com-
pelled to work in collaborative relationships not 
previously encouraged. Institutional turf issues and 
a history of vertical management in program minis-
tries made the transition to PROGRESA-style pro-
gramming an ongoing challenge. Oportunidades, as 
a continuation of PROGRESA, has become the 
largest poverty alleviation program in Mexico, con-
sequently attracting much attention as other politi-
cians and program planners try to carve out space 
for their own “new” poverty alleviation program. 
 
Policy Options 
 
Whom to Target? 
From the start, PROGRESA invested intellectual 
and financial resources in targeting program activi-
ties to the poorest households within the poorest 
rural localities. Although it seems commonsensical 
to target limited program resources, targeting does 
require resources that could otherwise be spent on 
direct program services. Theoretically, targeting is a 
good use of program resources when the benefits 
of targeting exceed the costs of not doing so. In 
the case of PROGRESA, an IFPRI analysis from the 
first two years of the program found that targeting 
resulted in an efficient use of program resources 
and that the targeting formula generally identified 
those most in need (that is, was a sensitive indica-
tor), while excluding those least likely to benefit 
(that is, was a specific indicator). A few areas for 
improvement in the targeting system were iden-
tified and corrected in later rounds of the program 
(Behrman et al. 1999).  
  
Targeting is also susceptible to political pressures, 
regardless of the size of the benefit-cost ratio. On 
the one hand, politicians may wish to curry favor 
by offering a program to all their constituents 
regardless of need. On the other hand, politicians 
concerned about an image of government waste 
may want to demonstrate effective government 
targeting of social programs. Targeting may also 
create local political and social disruptions between 
those who are included in the program and those 
who are not. For instance, might local non-bene-
ficiaries resent their neighbor’s inclusion in the 
program?   
 
How to Set Conditions? 
Like targeting, ensuring the compliance of benefi-
ciaries with PROGRESA program conditions 
required program administrators, schools, and 
clinics to expend resources that could have been 
otherwise spent. Additionally, for program benefi-
ciaries, complying with program conditions 
required time and money (such as for transporta-
tion and school clothes)—resources that may have 
been spent in other, potentially more beneficial, 
ways had the conditions not been in place. Some 
have also criticized the use of conditionality in the 
PROGRESA program for preventing the neediest 
families from gaining the educational and health 
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benefits because their overwhelming life conditions 
prevented them from meeting program require-
ments (Luccisano 2006). Nonetheless, analysis by 
IFPRI demonstrated not only that conditioning the 
receipt of program benefits encouraged program 
beneficiaries to engage in positive behaviors (that is, 
send children to school and seek out preventive 
care), but also that these changes are likely to lead 
to significant long-term increases in household 
earning potential and ultimately in Mexican 
economic development (Skoufias 2005).  
 
Program planners must be careful, however, about 
how the conditions are set. For instance, 
PROGRESA’s conditional cash transfers encouraged 
children to attend school until the beginning of 
high school, but then attendance markedly 
dropped. What are the benefits of encouraging 
these additional years of education? Would condi-
tions encouraging high school attendance influence 
other areas of economic and family life? For exam-
ple, would the loss of high school students in the 
workforce decrease immediate economic produc-
tion? Would older students delay the start of 
families? Would the kind of conditions offered to 
encourage high school attendance need to be 
changed? For example, would larger cash transfers 
be required, and would additional support for 
school or transportation costs be necessary? As 
discussed earlier, PROGRESA also appeared to 
encourage school attendance but did not emphasize 
school performance. What incentives could be 
offered to families to ensure that students maxi-
mize educational opportunities?  
 
Focus on Demand‐Side or Supply‐Side 
Activities 
Successful school performance is contingent on 
high-quality schools, supplies, and teachers. Incen-
tives to encourage exemplary school performance 
will falter if schools in program areas are under-
funded or offer poor-quality education. Similarly, 
what mechanisms are in place to ensure that the 
highest-quality health care is, and will continue to 
be, provided? A tension exists between providing 
the right balance of demand- and supply-side inter-
ventions in complex poverty alleviation programs. 
Evaluation of the early years of PROGRESA 
showed that the educational and health care 
systems were reasonably able to absorb this new 
demand. As Mexico’s poverty alleviation programs 
expand, however, and as new information about the 
quality of programming is made available, new deci-
sions must be made about the balance between 
demand- and supply-side interventions. 
 
Program Sustainability 
The objectives of PROGRESA will be realized over 
the medium and long term as children enrolled in 
the health and education programs mature, enter 
the workforce, and start their own families. Chil-
dren who enter the program for the first time in 
elementary school have at least a decade of pro-
gram participation ahead of them before any 
assessment of full program impact on economic 
productivity can be conducted, and it will be 
several decades before the long-term impact of 
program participation on intergenerational poverty 
can be determined. Unfortunately, many social 
programs are cut prematurely because of changes 
in national leadership, economic crises, and other 
events.  
   
To improve program sustainability, several strate-
gies can be considered. Strong champions for a 
program within the government, particularly cham-
pions at high levels of political leadership, can help 
sustain a program over the short and medium 
term, ensuring that a program receives the acco-
lades, attention, and resources it needs. But what 
happens when these champions are no longer in 
leadership positions? Some have suggested shifting 
PROGRESA from a program funded year by year 
to an entitlement program guaranteed by law, with 
the condition that the program will be phased out 
as it is no longer needed. The appearance of politi-
cal neutrality may also improve a social program’s 
sustainability during changes in national leadership.   
 
Program Consistency 
As time goes by, PROGRESA’s adherence to its 
program objectives can become muddied as new 
political leaders put pressure on PROGRESA to 
take up new initiatives or as new poverty alleviation 
initiatives are created outside of PROGRESA. 
PROGRESA is already an ambitious program, and 
asking it to do more, particularly with the same 
level of resources, risks doing nothing well. In addi-
tion, adding new incentives and benefits, either 
within or outside the PROGRESA program, in an 
unthoughtful way risks upsetting the careful 
balance of initiatives designed to enable residents to 
improve their lives without making them dependent 
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on the government for ongoing assistance. At the 
same time PROGRESA needs to maintain some 
flexibility to improve program implementation as a 
result of operational evaluation and changing com-
munity needs. Policy planners for PROGRESA face 
the challenge of pursuing strategies that continue 
to incur a neutral or favorable stance with politi-
cians while ensuring that the program meets its 
long-term goal of human capital development. 
 
Poverty Alleviation Is More Than One 
Program 
PROGRESA was only one prong in a three-
pronged approach to poverty alleviation in Mexico. 
PROGRESA’s role was to build the human capital 
of the rural poor population by ensuring a healthy, 
well-educated workforce. Income generation pro-
grams (such as job creation and credit programs) 
were to make use of this human capital by finding 
productive outlets for the poor to pull themselves 
out of poverty. Finally, rural infrastructure devel-
opment programs were to build the physical 
resources necessary for economic development. 
Although PROGRESA clearly made progress, its 
success in eliminating poverty is contingent on 
Mexico’s continuing to fund and support the other 
elements of the poverty alleviation strategy. Some 
researchers have criticized PROGRESA for essen-
tially creating better-educated citizens who are 
unable to find jobs to propel them out of poverty 
because of the low level of job creation and lack of 
employment opportunities in Mexico (Luccisano 
2006). Any policy options considered for 
PROGRESA should consider the connection of 
those policies to other programs needed to move 
Mexican households out of poverty. 
 
Assignment  
 
The government of a developing country would 
like to initiate a poverty alleviation program similar 
to PROGRESA. What suggestions would you make 
to improve the program? 
 
Additional Reading 
 
Levy, S. 2006. Progress against poverty: Sustaining 
Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades Program.  
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
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